Two years have elapsed since the United States withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, relinquishing authority to the Taliban. Nevertheless, the Taliban’s grip on the nation remains tenuous, and the prospect of Afghanistan descending into a failed state characterized by warring warlords and a breeding ground for terrorism looms if their governance falters. Regrettably, the international community is offering scant support to a potential counterforce against Taliban dominance, an issue that should now be of paramount concern.
Understanding the internal dynamics of the Taliban is challenging. A glimpse into their internal tensions emerged earlier this year when several prominent figures, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, the acting interior minister, and Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the acting deputy foreign minister, were captured on video expressing their dissent against the stringent control exerted by Hibatullah Akhunzada, the supreme leader issuing edicts from his stronghold in Kandahar. Although the public dissent was swiftly quashed and Stanikzai left the country, the underlying tensions have persisted. The central divide centers around the Haqqani network, which commands authority in Kabul and wields influence in the east, and the leadership based in Kandahar, located in the south. The Haqqani network’s origins trace back to Pakistan, with backing from Pakistani intelligence. While its formal alliance with the Taliban has spanned over a decade, strains have emerged in their relationship.
Both factions have been vying for the allegiance of steadfast commanders. Hibatullah is rumored to have relocated a unit of suicide bombers to Kandahar to bolster his security measures.
Transitioning from a guerrilla insurgency to a governing body has posed formidable challenges for the Taliban. Many ministries are now led by individuals with limited education backgrounds. During their years in the shadows, the Taliban established control through intimidation, a strategy that included the assassination of over 10,000 tribal elders and religious scholars, as per a military source. They also rallied public sentiment against the presidency of Ashraf Ghani, branding it as corrupt and excessively influenced by Western ideals.
Once in power, the Taliban sought complete media dominance. During their initial year in office, they permitted foreign journalists to enter the country; however, the issuance of visas has become increasingly rare. Publicized executions and the public flogging of individuals accused of adultery serve a dual purpose: instilling compliance through fear and showcasing their resolute jihadi credentials to potential recruits, who might otherwise be enticed by the expanding presence of the Islamic State-Khorasan Province.
Window of opportunity
Upon assuming power, the Taliban initially experienced a peace dividend, benefiting from the cessation of hostilities. In 2021, as the republic crumbled, the new Taliban government was reluctantly accepted by traditional tribal and religious leaders as an alternative, driven by a lack of better options amidst the chaos. However, this acceptance was contingent upon the promise of delivering stability. Over time, the Taliban’s inability to establish an inclusive administration, marked by the absence of significant non-Pashtun representation and the exclusion of women from meaningful roles, has incited opposition to their rule.
Despite being Afghanistan’s largest minority, Pashtuns constitute less than half of the population. The present-day Afghanistan that the Taliban confront differs drastically from the one they were ousted from in 2001. A new generation, characterized by distinct aspirations, particularly among women, is more inclined to put an end to the cycles of violence that have plagued the nation for the past five decades.
Sahraa Karimi, a prominent filmmaker who fled the country in August 2021, encapsulated this sentiment: “Our generation aspired to forge a fresh narrative for Afghanistan, one that promised progress, dynamism, hope, and advancement.”
In stark contrast, the Taliban regime presents an entirely different narrative, wherein girls are confined to their homes and boys receive a strict, narrow education in madrassas. The window of opportunity to reclaim the values that defined the Afghan republic is not indefinite and will eventually close.
Challenges of opposition
Just as the Taliban have encountered difficulties transitioning from insurgency to governance, those who held governmental positions have encountered their own challenges in forming a unified opposition front. These struggles are a reflection of the complexity of the situation. Afghanistan’s most capable individuals are scattered across the globe, focused on resettling their families, and many have found refuge in Canada’s western regions.
Afghanistan’s historical context further complicates matters. Due to intricate historical factors, political parties have been viewed with suspicion, and efforts to develop them during the post-9/11 republican era were minimal. Many former government officials were technocrats without practical political experience. The term ‘democracy’ itself is contentious, particularly in traditional regions of the country where it’s seen as a Western construct linked to corruption and mismanagement, seemingly incompatible with their Islamic culture. Delving into the 1980s and 90s, the baggage of the communist takeover supported by Russia and the subsequent mujahideen resistance further compounds the situation.
The downfall of the republic missed an opportunity to temper the potentially toxic impact of this historical legacy over the course of 20 years. While the mujahideen leaders, often referred to as ‘warlords,’ are now primarily situated in Turkey and might pose an obstacle, few anticipate their return to power. Constructing an opposition movement against the Taliban naturally generates tensions between activists within Afghanistan and those who have sought refuge elsewhere. Since the republic’s collapse, several women’s groups have emerged spontaneously within Afghanistan.
Shaharzad Akbar, former head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Council, has been observing these groups from the UK. She notes their desire for a firmer stance from the international community: “They are specifically requesting non-recognition of the Taliban.” These grassroots groups lack the financial support that Western NGOs received in the past, causing resentment towards the fleeing NGO activists. The most promising avenue for forging a cohesive opposition beyond Afghanistan’s borders is the Vienna process. This initiative, encompassing two conferences in Vienna and one in Dushanbe, established a working group to create a “single national umbrella organization” against the Taliban. Private funding and foundation support, rather than government involvement, have underpinned this process and other gatherings of the Afghan diaspora.
During a meeting in Doha with international envoys from over 20 countries, the United Nations Secretary-General engaged with the Taliban, yet no attempt was made to involve non-Taliban opposition groups. A paradox emerges: the international community overlooks an incoherent Afghan opposition while making no efforts to foster its cohesion.
Ambassadors of the republic play a pivotal role in fostering opposition efforts. Many remain in their embassies, with Nasir Andisha, the ambassador to Geneva, standing out as an effective advocate. Andisha acknowledges that constructing a unified platform will take time, requiring participants to deeply reflect on the mistakes that led to the republic’s collapse. He asserts, “I don’t think they could be in opposition if they don’t genuinely introspect.”
The failure of engagement
Two years have passed since the Taliban’s return to power, and it is evident that they have no intention of yielding to demands for a less repressive governance model, rendering the current engagement ineffective. Public declarations by the US, Britain, and the European Union have made it clear that they will not endorse armed resistance against the Taliban, which played a part in their reluctance to support the Vienna process. Nevertheless, prominent figures such as Nargis Nehan, a women’s activist and former government minister, contend that reclaiming power from the Taliban will necessitate military pressure.
Ahmad Massoud, commander of the prominent anti-Taliban armed group, the National Resistance Front (NRF), was present at both the Dushanbe and Vienna meetings. His father, Ahmed Shah Massoud, a successful mujahideen commander during the insurgency against Russian occupation in the 1980s, was assassinated on the eve of the 9/11 attacks. Beyond the NRF, which has demonstrated some efficacy in its fight in the Panjshir Valley northeast of Kabul, Yasin Zia, a former Afghan army chief of staff, has also achieved success in guerrilla operations, including targeted assassinations. Sami Sadat, another former Afghan general, has spent the majority of 2023 in the US, garnering support among veterans’ groups for a potential counteroffensive. Despite Taliban reprimands and objections to armed groups’ presence, such pressure should be resolutely disregarded.
While addressing women’s rights is undoubtedly pressing, UN agencies in Afghanistan have found themselves operating beyond their mandates due to their compliance with the Taliban’s ban on women workers since April of the current year. This issue must be resolved. However, as Manizha Bakhtari, the Afghan republic’s ambassador to Vienna, highlights, this matter has monopolized the discourse, overshadowing discussions about the connections between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. She advocates for a comprehensive approach, asserting that the world should address these concerns in tandem.
The US administration seems hesitant to discuss the Al-Qaeda association. It’s apparent that Washington prefers to downplay reminders of the withdrawal chaos and focus on the Taliban’s purported willingness to cooperate against terrorism. On June 30, President Joe Biden made an off-script, seemingly delusional comment during a press conference: “Remember what I said about Afghanistan? I said Al-Qaeda would not be there. I said we’d get help from the Taliban. What’s happening now? What’s going on? Read your press. I was right.” Ironically, just four days prior to his comment, a headline painted a more accurate picture: “Taliban Flouts Terrorism Commitments by Appointing Al-Qaeda-Affiliated Governors.” This headline referred to a UN report that highlighted the “strong and symbiotic” relationship between the two organizations, with Al-Qaeda “rebuilding operational capability” from its Afghan base.
The UN report leaves little room for interpretation: “Promises made by the Taliban in August 2021 to be more inclusive, break with terrorist groups… and not pose a security threat to other countries seem increasingly hollow, if not plain false, in 2023.”
Given the disconnect between the reality on the ground and the optimistic outlook of the Biden administration, it’s unlikely that a coherent US strategy will emerge in the short term. However, the broader Western perspective extends beyond America. There exists an opportunity, at a relatively low cost, for other nations to support potential Afghan opposition movements and the civil society and media sectors necessary for their development.
It is believed that international donors provide around $40 million weekly to Kabul, although precise figures are not publicly disclosed. Governments should be able to ensure these funds are directed appropriately while concurrently exploring potential political actors beyond the Taliban. This can be achieved without endorsing armed activities. However, there has been minimal interest in assisting emerging leaders.
The European Institute of Peace, led by its executive director Michael Keating, is exploring another initiative aimed at constructing a civic platform for dialogue among Afghans, including the Taliban. This endeavor is explicitly non-violent; however, securing funding for it has proven to be challenging.
The complexity of the situation is widely acknowledged. The diversity of interests among non-Taliban Afghans makes achieving a unified platform a formidable task. Nargis Nehan, an advocate for women’s rights, suggested that supporting multiple initiatives might be the most effective approach: “By aggregating these smaller efforts,” she remarked, “we can incorporate a substantial array of diverse viewpoints.” She also highlighted the potential for creatively funding local activists without relying on channels in Kabul.
Alternatively, regional stakeholders, most notably Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran, might endeavor to cultivate their own spheres of influence. Having dispelled any illusions of effective engagement with the Taliban, these countries recognize the potential threats emanating from Afghanistan-based movements. As indicated by a UN report, approximately 20 insurgent groups are now operating alongside the Taliban, and the intertwining of Al-Qaeda with the government is evident, as its training manuals are being used within the Ministry of Defence.
Read more: People Left Disturbed After AI Creates Images Of Human-Shaped Animals
3 Comments